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Volatile natural resource income requires an intergenerational and liquidity fund. 
We use intertemporal stochastic optimization and historical data for Alberta. 
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The effect of the 2014 plunge in oil prices on our estimates of the funds is examined. 
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Abstract 
We use a welfare-based intertemporal stochastic optimization model and historical data to 
estimate the size of the optimal intergenerational and liquidity funds and the corresponding 
resource dividend available to the government of the Canadian province Alberta. To first-order 
of approximation, this dividend should be a constant fraction of total above- and below-ground 
wealth, complemented by additional precautionary savings at initial times to build up a small 
liquidity fund to cope with oil price volatility. The ongoing dividend equals approximately 30 
per cent of government revenue and requires building assets of approximately 40 per cent of 
GDP in 2030, 100 per cent of GDP in 2050 and 165 per cent in 2100. Finally, the effect of the 
recent plunge in oil prices on our estimates is examined. Our recommendations are in stark 
contrast with historical and current government policy.  
Keywords: oil price volatility, precautionary saving, resource wealth, fiscal policy 
JEL codes: E21, E22, D91, Q32 
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1. Introduction 
The mission of the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund is “to provide prudent stewardship of 
the savings from Alberta’s non-renewable resources by providing the greatest financial returns 
on those savings for the current and future generations of Albertans.” The fund was created in 
1976 when 30 per cent of government resource revenue was transferred to the fund. With the 
economic crises of the early 1980s, this percentage was halved and eventually cut to zero in 
1987. Once the Alberta government had eliminated its accumulated debt in 2005 and showed 
budget surpluses, revenue was again transferred to the fund. Since its inception, $
1
33 billion has 
been withdrawn from the Alberta Heritage Fund to support spending in health care, education, 
infrastructure, debt reduction and social programs. The value of this fund stood at $15.1 billion, 
or 4.7 per cent of Alberta’s GDP in March 2014 ($14.9 billion or 4.8 per cent of GDP in March 
2013).
2
 In addition to this fund, a second, much smaller fund, the Contingency Account, with a 
value of $4.7 billion or 1.5 per cent of Alberta’s GDP in March 2014 ($2.7 billion or 0.9 per 
cent of GDP in March 2013) is used to smooth revenue arising from volatilities in oil and gas 
prices.
3
 These two funds are examples of what are known in the literature as, respectively, an 
intergenerational fund and a liquidity fund. We will call the combined total of these two funds 
simply “the fund.”4  
With fossil fuel extraction rates remaining high for years to come, but the decline in crude oil 
prices toward the end of 2014 illustrating their inherent uncertainty, the time is ripe to take a 
                                                          
1
 All dollar values ($) reported are Canadian dollars, unless indicated otherwise.  
2
 We use the book values reported in the annual budget documents by Alberta Finance. Using the slightly 
higher current fair market value would only marginally affect our calculations and leave our qualitative 
policy recommendations unaltered. 
3
 Given the objective of fiscal stabilization, the contingency account is much more invested in short-term, 
fixed-income securities than the Heritage Savings Fund. 
4
 Both figures come from Alberta’s 2014 provincial budget 
 (http://finance.alberta.ca/publications/budget/budget2014/fiscal-plan-savings-plan.pdf).  
The Alberta Government has a number of smaller funds, which include the Medical Research Endowment 
Fund, the Science and Engineering Endowment Fund and the Scholarship Fund. Their total value is $3.4 
billion or 1.1 per cent of Alberta’s GDP as of March 2014 ($3.5 billion or 1.1 per cent of Alberta’s GDP 
as of March 2013). We do not include these smaller funds, since they are domestic investment funds. The 
merit of these funds should be decided on the basis of their social returns. If these returns are satisfactory, 
Alberta can make use of international capital markets to finance these and not the Heritage Fund.  
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more structural approach to managing Alberta’s fund. We argue that it is useful to distinguish 
between an intergenerational fund to distribute the temporary proceeds from resource wealth 
over many generations and a liquidity or precautionary savings fund to cushion the adverse 
impact on government income of a drop in the world price of oil. We use intertemporal 
stochastic welfare optimization to derive the optimal savings policy. This distinguishes our 
paper from Landon and Smith (2015), who use Monte-Carlo techniques to quantitatively 
compare welfare of several ad-hoc saving rules. Our approach is similar to that of Bems and de 
Carvalho Filho (2013), who examine the effect of precautionary saving on the current account 
on a number of countries, and van den Bremer and van der Ploeg (2013), who examine Norway, 
Iraq and Ghana. Specifically, our focus here is on the implication for government fiscal policy 
for the Albertan government. 
In addition to the recent work by Landon and Smith (2015), Bems and de Carvalho Filho (2013) 
and van den Bremer and van der Ploeg (2013) discussed, many authors have studied different 
aspects of the important question which share of volatile and temporary resource revenues to 
save, invest and spend and even more have examined its operational policy implications. For 
example, Barnett and Ossowski (2003) have examined how volatile government resource 
revenues can lead to the unproductive use of government funds. Based on historical experience, 
Fasano (2000), Bacon and Tordo  (2002) and Kumar et al (2009) have argued for clear and 
transparent fiscal rules for payment into and out of a fund. Arrau and Claessens (1992), Engel 
and Valdes (2009) and Bartsch (2006) among others have used Monte Carlo simulations to 
assess the performance of stability funds. What sets our paper apart from this applied policy 
literature is that we have set out to expose the fundamental economic channel to optimal policy. 
Ultimately, this relies on the permanent income hypothesis modified for uncertain income to 
reveal the effect of prudence and precautionary saving (Kimball 1990).  
We use historical data on extraction costs, prices and tax revenues and official projections of 
extraction rates for Alberta to calculate the size and development of the optimal 
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intergenerational and liquidity funds and the corresponding resource dividends, the amount 
taken annually from the fund and from the resource revenues to be used for general budget 
purposes. In doing so, we distinguish oil, natural gas and bitumen revenues. How much of the 
dividend is allocated to public spending, tax cuts or handouts depends on political preferences.
5
 
The Mintz Commission recommended a target of $100 billion in net financial assets by 2030 
and saving a fixed percentage of Alberta’s total revenues each year as part of the budget 
(Alberta Financial Investment and Planning Advisory Commission, 2007). Once this target is 
achieved, the commission foresaw a permanent annual income of $4.5 billion to fund public 
services and/or maintain low taxes in the future. 
Although we focus on oil and gas price volatility, long-term risk is also based on future, 
unknown changes in technologies, resource discoveries and transportation investments (e.g., 
approval of the extended Keystone Pipeline System) and uncertainties about future carbon-
emission constraints and other policies that impact Alberta’s ability to maintain or expand 
resource production. Our estimates of optimal precautionary saving which only take into 
account resource price volatility thus provide a lower bound.  
This paper is laid out as follows. Our principles of managing the intergenerational and liquidity 
funds are derived and outlined in sections 2 and 3, respectively. Our estimates of the optimal 
sizes of these funds for Alberta, based on the data discussed in section 4, are presented in 
section 5. Crucially, section 6 discusses the sensitivity of our results. Finally, section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. How to Build an Intergenerational Fund 
                                                          
5
 To strengthen the supply side, one could use the dividend for investment, infrastructure and tax cuts. 
The Mintz Commission (Alberta Financial Investment and Planning Advisory Commission, 2007) 
dismissed Alaska-style dividend payments as they are lump-sum in nature and have little benefit for the 
economy. We abstract from the specific allocation of the resource dividend herein, but focus on its 
optimal size. 
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Revenue from fossil fuel
6
 extraction is temporary, as revenues end when resources are 
exhausted or too costly to extract, and volatile due to volatile prices. For these reasons, the 
revenues provide a rationale for an intergenerational fund to smooth consumption per capita 
across generations and a liquidity fund to cushion the impact of volatility of the world oil price. 
We discuss the former first, abstracting from oil price volatility, and discuss the latter in section 
3. We assume a deterministic return on foreign assets r and a fixed marginal cost of extracting 
one unit of oil. Utility increases at a decreasing rate in the resource dividend D. The government 
maximizes utilitarian welfare: 
(1)     ( ), , , max ( ) / ( ) ( ) tt
D
t
J t F P Y E U C L L e d    


 
  
 
 , 
where  > 0 is the social discount rate and L the population size. We explicitly define the 
resource dividend as the difference between total consumption and non-oil production in the rest 
of the economy: D C Y  . Non-oil production Y is assumed to be an exogenous process that 
grows exponentially at a rate of n g , with n denoting population and g productivity growth. 
Equation (1) must be solved subject to the budget constraint: 
(2) 
0, (0) ,F rF D F F    
where F denotes the fund size and  the oil rents. Equations (1-2) give the Keynes-Ramsey rule 
for consumption growth: 
(3)   ( ) ,
dC
n r C
dt
      
where  > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, having assumed a utility function of 
the form  1 1( ) 1 1U C C    ,  and n is the rate of population growth. The coefficient of 
relative intergenerational inequality aversion is 1/. If we further assume the ratio of 
consumption and non-oil production is constant in the absence of oil revenues 
                                                          
6
 Throughout, we refer to ‘oil’ as a general term to include conventional oil, natural gas and bitumen. 
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 ( ) 0r g    , an assumption discussed further below, we obtain for the resource dividend: 
 ( )dD dt n r D    .  
By substituting (3) into the present-value budget constraint and solving, we find that the optimal 
resource dividend is a constant fraction of total financial and subsoil oil wealth: 
(4)     ( )( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ,r t
t
D t r r n F t V t V t e d   

             
where oil wealth V is the present value of oil rents. Lower oil extraction costs and larger 
reserves imply larger oil wealth. 
2.1. Policy implications 
We choose the social discount rate so that the resource dividend and thus the total of financial 
and oil wealth grow at the same rate as the rest of the economy.
7
 Having denoted the per-capita 
growth rate of non-oil GDP by g > 0, non-oil GDP, the resource dividend and total wealth all 
grow at the rate g + n, if we set the social discount rate to  = r  g/ < r. The social discount 
rate must thus be lower in a growing economy to ensure that more saving occurs and the per-
capita resource dividend grows over time. If it is easier to substitute present for future 
consumption (high ), this correction term is smaller. From (4) the propensity to consume out of 
total wealth is ( ) .r r n r g n        Both the resource dividend and total wealth per 
capita then grow at the rate of productivity growth g. As fractions of GDP they are fully 
smoothed across different generations. 
The permanent component of oil revenue is the annuity value of current and future oil revenues, 
which is the growth-corrected interest on oil wealth (r  n g) V. The temporary component of 
oil revenue is current minus permanent revenue. If oil revenue is expected to increase (decrease) 
                                                          
7
 Since V rV   and F rF D  , with dots denoting time derivatives, we obtain 
      ( )F V F V r D F V r n          (from (4)).   
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over time, temporary revenue is negative (positive). The deterministic permanent income 
hypothesis thus offers the following guidelines for managing resource wealth: 
(i) The resource dividend that is available to fund the government budget is a constant 
proportion of total above- and below-ground wealth. It grows at the rate of GDP 
growth even if oil revenues decline over time, and remains a constant proportion of 
each generation’s non-oil income. 
(ii) The decline in below-ground oil wealth is exactly compensated by an increase in 
above-ground financial wealth so total wealth remains a constant fraction of total 
GDP (Hartwick, 1977). 
(iii) The faster the rate of oil depletion and decline in oil revenues, the larger the 
proportion of revenue that is saved in the intergenerational fund in order that future 
generations benefit from the current boom in oil revenue. The savings rate out of oil 
revenues thus varies over time.  
2.2. Other choices of discount rates 
Our pragmatic choice for the social discount rate  = r  g/ < r has its merits, but two 
alternatives should be kept in mind. First,  = r ensures that per-capita consumption is constant 
and reduces or reverses the rationale for an intergenerational fund if productivity growth is 
positive. With the prospect of even small productivity growth over an infinite horizon, an 
incentive arises to borrow heavily to start consuming the permanent value of non-resource GDP 
now, which goes against the motive to save in the face of declining oil revenues. In the absence 
of present oil revenue, this borrowing can often not be realized, as it requires borrowing with 
future growth as collateral. Crucially, the uncertain nature of future GDP growth would need to 
be taken into account, significantly depressing its expected present value and the corresponding 
consumption increment Secondly, if incumbent politicians try to secure re-election and become 
impatient, we might have   > r so the propensity to consume out of current wealth is higher and 
the economy saves less and gets poorer with the passage of time. This effect is less pronounced 
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if politicians have a high willingness to substitute present for future consumption, i.e., a low 
elasticity of intergenerational inequality aversion (high ). Although aware of its implications, 
we proceed under the assumption  = r  g/ , as it allows us to assess the incremental effect of 
the temporary oil revenues on optimal savings, which would be zero in their absence.  
 
3. Oil Price Volatility and the Case for a Liquidity Fund 
To derive the optimal size of the liquidity fund, we extend section 2 to allow for oil price 
uncertainty, where the oil price
8
 is assumed to follow an autoregressive process with high 
persistence (see appendix B for details of the calibration). The problem is thus to maximize (1) 
subject to:  
(2)  
bitumen, crude oil, natural gas
, ( ) ( ) ( ),i i i
i
dF
rF D t P t O t
dt


      
where Pi is the price in $/barrel of oil equivalent (b.o.e.), i  the constant unit extraction cost in 
$/b.o.e. and Oi the extraction rate in b.o.e./year. The Keynes-Ramsey rule then becomes: 
(3)    
2
21 1 ,
2
t D
D
E dD r n D CRP D
dt D Y
  
 
          
  
where CRP denote the coefficient of relative prudence and D  the volatility of the dividend 
(see appendix A). Prudent policy-making is built on a greater desire to avoid negative outcomes 
than to seek positive outcomes. We have from (3) with our choice of the discount rate that the 
dividend as fraction of GDP grows at the rate: 
(5)  
2
21 1 1 0,
2
t D
D
E dD n g CRP
D dt D Y

 
    
 
 
where D  is not a constant (see appendix A). 
                                                          
8
 We adopt three separate correlated price processes for conventional oil, natural gas and bitumen.  
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Hence, the greater the coefficient of relative prudence and the greater the volatility of the 
dividend, the greater the optimal precautionary buffers that are needed to act as insurance 
against future drops in oil prices.
9
 Furthermore, volatility and the buffers are higher if oil price 
shocks are less transient, as a greater part of the revenue resulting from shocks is consumed in 
terms of the resource dividend if these shocks are more permanent thus resulting in larger values 
for the partial derivatives in (6) (see appendix A for details). If the stochastic shocks are 
permanent (cf., random walk) and all future oil prices change by the same amount as the initial 
shock, the required precautionary buffers are large. If shocks are transient and do not impact 
future oil prices, very little precautionary saving is required. With mean reversion in price 
shocks, the precautionary buffers are smaller.
10
 Finally, there is less need for buffers if 
productivity growth g makes future generations richer and hence better able to deal with future 
income shocks, as reflected by the ratio of the dividend D and total consumption C = D+Y in 
equation (5). 
 
4. Data and Assumptions for Alberta
11
 
To calculate the optimal intergenerational and liquidity funds and resulting dividends for 
Alberta, we distinguish between rents from bitumen, conventional oil and natural gas. Although 
we follow official projections until 2022, we examine two scenarios for the bitumen-extraction 
paths after that date, where the second scenario is considered in the sensitivity analysis. This 
section introduces the parameter choice for the base case presented in this paper. A sensitivity 
analysis is undertaken in section 6.  
4.1. Extraction rates and reserve estimates 
                                                          
9
 Here, precautionary savings are channeled into a fund, but they can also appear as current account 
surpluses in a small open economy (e.g, Bems and de Carvalho Filho, 2013). 
10
 In contrast, temporary revenue requires more saving in the intergenerational fund. 
11
 Further details can be found in appendix B. 
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For the extraction rates of bitumen, conventional oil, and natural gas, we use official projections 
available until 2022. In these official projections production of bitumen rises from 0.72 to 1.4 
billion barrels per year during the period 2012–2022. Production of conventional oil and natural 
gas are set to decline from 0.20 and 0.58 to0.17 and 0.44 barrels of oil equivalent,
12
 
respectively, over the same period. Allowing for some new discoveries, we set initial reserves to 
168 billion barrels of bitumen, 4.7 billion barrels of conventional oil and 15.4 billion barrels of 
oil equivalent of natural gas. Based on these numbers, figure 1 presents two scenarios for the 
period after 2022. Scenario 1 is the base case scenario. In this scenario, extraction of bitumen 
continues to increase linearly after 2022 until reaching a value of 2.0 billion barrels per year,  
remaining constant afterwards until exhaustion.  
 INSERT FIGURE 1 
4.2. Government resource rents 
In order to calculate government resource rents, we must first calculate resource rents 
 (( () ) )i i ii tt tP O  . We use extraction costs of $15 per barrel of oil equivalent for both 
conventional oil and natural gas. To reflect the large costs associated with bitumen production, 
we use an extraction cost of $32 per barrel. We assume conventional oil is sold at the WTI price 
and natural gas at the Henry Hub NYMEX natural gas price, but use the much lower (also 
below Western Canadian Select) average field gate price to estimate the actual price of a barrel 
of bitumen. For all three resource prices, we adopt AR(1) price processes, reflecting the 
significant reversion to the mean observed in resource prices. We use the calibration in van den 
Bremer and van der Ploeg (2013) for the conventional oil and natural gas price with a mean 
price of $110 per barrel, a mean reversion of six per cent per year, and a volatility of 26 per cent 
                                                          
12
 1,000 bbl of natural gas corresponds to 1.000 bbl of oil equivalent (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
“Facts: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector” (Oslo: Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011), 
http://www.npd.no/ en/Publications/Facts/Facts-2011), which corresponds approximately to equivalent 
energy content. Under this definition, the per barrel of oil equivalent price of natural gas is significantly 
lower than the price of oil per barrel, which reflects imperfect substitution and, to a lesser extent, 
transportation costs. 
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for conventional oil. For natural gas, we take a mean price of $32 per barrel of oil equivalent, a 
mean reversion of six per cent per year, and a volatility of 20 per cent. For bitumen, we adopt 
the same mean reversion and volatility, but a substantially lower mean price of $80 per barrel. 
We assume these prices are perfectly correlated. Initial prices at the start of 2013 are $96 per 
barrel natural of oil, $64 per barrel of bitumen and $11 per barrel of oil equivalent of natural 
gas. Extraction of natural gas will initially not be profitable, but becomes profitable when the 
price reverts back to the mean. If extraction cost exceeds the price of natural gas, gas rents are 
zero. To reflect the very significant effect the choice of initial (and mean) prices has on our 
estimates, illustrated, once again, by the drop in prices towards the end of 2014, we consider the 
effect of such a drop in section 6.4.  
As our focus lies on optimal fiscal policy for the government of Alberta, we assume a constant 
share of 34 per cent of resource rents accrues to the government through different taxes and 
levies, as supported by the data (the 2002–2012 average), thus abstracting from any non-
linearity in the tax regime. Finally, we assume that the share of the non-oil part of government 
revenue as a share of non-oil GDP is constant at 14 per cent (corresponding to the 2002–2012 
average). We report the optimal resource dividend: the increase in government spending that is 
made possible by the resource revenues.  
4.3. Return on the fund and general economic trends 
The initial size of the fund is $17.6 billion (both the Contingency Account and the Heritage 
Savings Trust Fund in March 2013) and is almost 6.0 per cent of total GDP. We set the real 
return on the fund to r = 6.1 per cent per year (the average annual real return on the Alberta 
Heritage Savings Trust Fund from 2002 to 2012). We will also present, to verify robustness, our 
estimates for a lower real return on 4.5 per cent per year in section 6.2. Trend population growth 
n is set at 1.3 per cent per year, the long-term projected growth rate for 2014–41.13 The trend 
                                                          
13
 Taken from Alberta Finance, Population Projection: Alberta 2014-2041 (2014), 
http://finance.alberta.ca/aboutalberta/population-projections/2014-2041-alberta-population-
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productivity growth rate g is set at 2.0 per cent per year, so trend growth of non-resource GDP 
is 3.3 per cent per year. We take an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of  = 0.5 and thus 
set the rate of discount to  = r  g/0.5 = 2.1 per cent per year.  
 
5. Optimal Intergenerational and Liquidity Funds for Alberta 
5.1. Benchmark estimates and the effects of prudence 
Figure 2 reports the optimal dividend and size of the fund for extraction scenario 1 for various 
degrees of prudence. The continuous (red) line in figure 2a corresponds to the optimal resource 
dividend, expressed as a percentage of government revenue, to build up an intergenerational 
fund. The continuous (red) line in figure 2b shows the optimal size of the intergenerational fund, 
which corresponds to the case without volatility or without prudence. The intergenerational fund 
grows gradually from 5.7 per cent of GDP in 2013 to 159 per cent in 2100. This sustains an 
annual dividend between 25 and 31 per cent of government revenue.
14
 The dashed (purple) and 
dotted (light blue) lines in figure 2 correspond to a moderate (benchmark) and high prudence.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 
The optimal initial dividend drops from 28 (CRP = 0) to 26 and 21 per cent for degrees of 
relative prudence of 3 and 10, respectively. The additional initial precautionary saving leads to 
the buildup of a larger fund with a final fund size in 2110 of 6.5 and 21 percentage points larger 
for degrees of relative prudence of 3 and 10, respectively. For the benchmark case of CRP = 3, 
the liquidity fund, given by the difference between the CRP = 0 and CRP = 3 lines, is thus 
small compared with the intergenerational fund: it grows gradually to a mere 6.5 per cent of 
GDP in 2100. However, with a much larger relative prudence of 10, the dotted (light blue) lines 
                                                                                                                                                                          
projections.pdf. In the past, Alberta has seen high rates of population growth with a 10-year average of 
2.2 per cent and 20-year average of 2.0 per cent population growth (Statistics Canada, 2013). 
14
 In fact, the optimal dividend as a share of non-oil GDP is constant in the absence of uncertainty. 
Variations here merely reflect normalization by total GDP (non-oil + oil GDP), which does not grow at a 
constant rate unlike non-oil GDP due to changes in the rates of resource extraction. 
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indicate that the accumulated liquidity fund is much larger, as reflected by a smaller initial 
dividend and larger expected resource dividends in the long run. 
Table 1 reports the optimal fund sizes as percentages of GDP and the resource dividends as 
percentages of government revenue if CRP = 3. We also report, in brackets, our estimates for 
the optimal fund sizes and resource dividends in thousands of 2013 dollars per capita, corrected 
for productivity growth (the per capita fund sizes grow at the rate of 2.0 per cent per year) and, 
finally, uncorrected for this growth. 
 INSERT TABLE 1  
The total fund starts at about $4,500 per capita in 2013 (5.7 per cent of GDP) and grows to 
$32,600 per capita in 2030 (39 per cent of GDP) and then to $76,900 per capita in 2050 (101 per 
cent of GDP) and $117,000 per capita in 2100 (165 per cent of GDP) — all figures in 2013 
constant dollars, corrected for growth. This sustains an annual dividend of $2,800 in 2013 (26 
per cent of government revenue) and $3,200 per capita from 2050 onwards (approximately 30 
per cent of public revenue).
15
  
This dividend in per capita terms is corrected for productivity growth too, so grows with the rest 
of the economy at 2.0 per cent per year. This means that the per capita dividend and per capita 
GDP grow by a factor of 2.1  exp(0.02 (2050 2013))   between 2013 and 2050. In real terms, 
the uncorrected per capita dividend grows from $2,800 in 2013 to $6,600 in 2050. 
It is instructive to compare our results for Alberta with those for Norway, Iraq and Ghana (van 
den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2013). The dividend of $2,800 per capita is much larger than 
that for Ghana (U.S.$37 per capita), larger than that for Iraq (U.S.$1,528 per capita), but 
roughly a factor three smaller than that for Norway (U.S.$8,537 per capita). The optimal final 
size of the intergenerational and liquidity fund for Alberta reached in 2100 (159 per cent and 6.5 
                                                          
15
 Since government revenue as percentage of non-resource GDP is constant and resource rents decline, 
government revenue as a percentage of total GDP rises slightly. 
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per cent of non-resource GDP, respectively) are rather less than the final fund sizes for Norway 
(677 per cent and three per cent of non-resource GDP) and very much smaller than those for 
Iraq (172 and 12 times non-resource GDP), but larger than those for Ghana (115 per cent and 
0.2 per cent of GDP). Norway is perhaps the most natural comparison for Alberta. Natural 
resource revenues last longer in Alberta and thus there is less need to smooth resource dividends 
across generations and a smaller intergenerational fund is needed. Comparing to Iraq, it is 
evident that both windfalls may last for an equally long time, but that they make up a much 
smaller share of total GDP in the case of Alberta, thus considerably reducing the precautionary 
motive.  
5.2. Comparison with the spend-all and bird-in-hand rules 
Figure 3 compares the benchmark with CRP = 3 and the intergenerational fund outcomes 
corresponding to CRP = 0 with a spend-all policy. The dash-dotted (blue) line denoted by 
“Spend all” shows government resource rents as percentage of total government revenue and 
thus corresponds to spending all resource rents directly without saving. This spend-all policy is 
suboptimal for three reasons. Firstly, with excessive spending in the first two decades and a 
much too rapid decline thereafter not leaving a dividend for future generations, benefits are 
clearly not smoothed optimally across generations. Secondly, precautionary buffers are not built 
up to protect against a future drop in oil prices. Finally, with a significant degree of mean 
reversion in the oil prices, the resource dividend with a spend-all policy leaves the government 
budget exposed to extreme volatility. 
The dotted (orange) lines in figures 3a and 3b illustrate a Norwegian style bird-in-hand (BIH) 
rule, which does not allow the use of reserves as collateral, puts all resource revenue in the fund 
and withdraws a fixed 4.0 per cent per year from the fund for general purposes (Bjerkholt, 2002; 
Barnett and Ossowski, 2003). We observe that under this rule, wealth is accumulated much 
more quickly than under the optimal rule, even allowing for the effects of prudence and 
precautionary savings (i.e., contrasting with the continuous (red) and dashed (purple) lines). 
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INSERT FIGURE 3 
Finally, figure 4 shows that, compared with the optimal policy, dividends under the bird-in-hand 
rule are much too low in the initial periods of the windfall and too high once the windfall has 
faded away. The optimal policy thus spends a much larger percentage of the fund in the early 
years and a much lower percentage in later years compared to the bird-in-hand rule. Hence, 
given substantial amount of below-ground natural resource wealth, it is sub-optimal to set the 
resource dividend (as Norway does) to a fixed percentage of just above-ground financial wealth. 
 INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis 
This section discusses the sensitivity of the results presented in the previous section to changes 
in the production scenario, the real return on assets in the fund, the correlation between oil and 
gas prices and the initial price level. 
6.1. Alternative production scenarios 
As discussed in section 2, the timing of the windfall has important implications for optimal 
savings behavior. In the benchmark extraction scenario 1 rents reach a peak of approximately 40 
per cent of government revenue in 2030. Such an increase reduces the need for intergenerational 
saving. In the second scenario, the increase in production of bitumen only continues until  
reaching a value of 1.4 billion barrels per year (compared to 2.0 billion barrels per year in 
scenario 1), followed by a similar plateau until exhaustion at a later date, as illustrated in figures 
1a and 1b. Extraction paths for conventional oil and natural gas, which are set to run out much 
sooner, are not varied across the scenarios. 
The dashed- and solid (green) lines denoted by CRP = 3 in figure 5a show that the initial 
optimal spending increment initially drops from 26 per cent in scenario 1 to 23 per cent of 
government revenue in scenario 2 (with CRP = 3). Since, in the alternative scenario 2, the 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
 
17 
 
windfall is more spread out over time, a smaller fund has to be built up in the long run. 
However, more funds have to be accumulated in the short run as production reaches a plateau 
earlier. The dashed- and solid (green) lines in figure 5b illustrate the effects on the total fund 
(CRP = 3) for the two scenarios. 
 INSERT FIGURE 5 
6.2. Effects of a lower real return on assets 
Figure 6 compares the case of a real return on assets of 6.1 per cent (base case) based on 
realized returns by the Alberta Heritage Fund over 2002-2012 to a perhaps more realistic long-
term return of 4.5 per cent. Lowering the rate of return, depresses the dividend in the long run, 
from 33 per cent to 19 per cent of government revenue. It also leads to a greater accumulation of 
assets and thus to a larger fund (figure 6b), as the below-ground wealth that is being converted 
into above-ground wealth is simply worth more when discounted at a lower rate. The fund size 
in 2100 is now 215 per cent instead of 165 per cent of GDP. 
 INSERT FIGURE 6 
6.3. Correlation between gas and oil prices 
Short-term instability of revenue in Alberta can be driven as much by fluctuations in gas prices 
as by fluctuations in bitumen prices. This is why it is important to stabilize revenue through 
resource diversification. Empirically, there has been a high degree of negative correlation 
between oil and gas prices. Although we can allow for such a negative correlation, we find that 
this does not matter much as rents for natural gas only make up a small part of total resource 
rents. For example, if the correlation coefficient between gas and oil prices is taken to be -0.5 
instead of 1.0, the resource dividend as fraction of public revenue and the fund size as a 
percentage of GDP are hardly affected, simply reflecting the fact that most revenues are derived 
from conventional oil and bitumen and not from natural gas. 
6.4. The plunge in oil price 
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To illustrate the potential effect of a sudden plunge in oil prices, such as the one observed since 
the end of 2014, figure 7a shows the initial resource dividend as a function of the initial (and 
mean) oil price with figure 7b illustrating the final fund size. Although only the initial 
conventional oil price is shown on the horizontal axis, we vary the initial prices of bitumen, 
conventional oil and natural gas by applying the same scale factor to each. We perform two 
experiments. In the first experiment, we adjust both initial and mean prices reflecting a price 
jump that is permanent (the two steepest (blue) lines denoted by “Initial and mean adjusted”). In 
the  second experiment, we only adjust the initial prices reflecting a price jump that is temporary 
and prices reverting to the original mean values (the two shallowest (red) lines denoted by 
“Initial adjusted”). In doing so, we intend to capture the arbitrary nature of any initial price 
assumption of a process with strong random walk characteristics and the lack of robust 
estimates of the mean price despite evidence of mean reversion and the relative stability of 
estimates of the rate of mean reversion.  
 INSERT FIGURE 7 
It is evident then from figure 7 that a temporary drop in conventional oil prices to 60 dollars per 
barrel, reduces the initial resource dividend as percentage of government revenue from 26 to 18 
percent of government revenue, with resource revenues dropping from 29 to 7.9 per cent, and 
cuts the size of the sovereign wealth fund in 2100 from 165 to 114 percent of total GDP. If we 
also modify the mean prices proportionally and thus consider a permanent plunge, the resource 
dividend and the size of the fund in 2100 drop even further, to 9.0 and 78 per cent, respectively. 
Since oil price shocks are very persistent, the size of the resource dividend and the fund that is 
accumulated varies strongly with the initial oil price that pertains after a truly permanent shock. 
Compared to our base case, the 2014 plunge implies 30 per cent drop in current resource 
dividend and final fund size, whereas the drop is a staggering 65 per cent for the dividend and 
53 per cent for the final fund size, when the effect is permanent and mean prices also adapt. 
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Finally, to obtain a sense of the sensitivity to the degree of mean reversion, figure 8 compares 
the base case with and without mean reversion. As discussed in appendix A (and B.5), both a 
pure random walk and a mean-reverting process for the oil price are difficult to reject on 
statistical grounds. The (red) lines denoted by AR(1) correspond to the base case discussed in 
section 5 with rates of mean reversion of 6.0 per cent for the three price processes, initial prices 
of $64, $96 and $11 per barrel of oil equivalent for bitumen, conventional oil and natural gas, 
reverting to mean prices of $80, $100 and $32 per barrel of oil equivalent, respectively. 
 INSERT FIGURE 8  
Setting the degree of mean reversion to zero and thus adopting random walk processes for the 
prices, the (blue) lines denoted by RW show the corresponding resource dividends and fund 
buildup. From these lines it is evident that the absence of a reversion to a higher mean, reduces 
the final size of the intergenerational fund from 165 per cent of GDP to 136 per cent in 2100. 
Accordingly, the initial dividend is lower: 22 per cent versus 28 per cent with mean reversion. 
More importantly, the persistence of shocks now necessitates much greater precautionary 
savings. At the initial time, the resource dividend drops from 26 to 15 per cent of government 
revenue and the liquidity fund now constitutes 18 per cent instead of a mere 6.5 per cent with 
mean reversion at t = 2100.  
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Following Ossowski (2002), Kneebone (2006) and the Mintz Commission (Alberta Financial 
Investment Planning Advisory Commission, 2007), our welfare-theoretic analysis examines the 
optimal savings path of resource revenues in an intergenerational fund to spread the resource 
wealth across generations and in a liquidity or buffer fund to deal with oil price volatility. We 
focus our attention on the three main non-renewable resources, bitumen, conventional oil and 
natural gas, and do not consider renewable resources such as forestry. Crucially, we have 
chosen the social discount rate such that the optimal resource dividend is a constant fraction of 
GDP. The per-capita resource dividend thus grows in line with the rest of the economy. Our 
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results suggest that policy in Alberta in can be improved in two ways. Firstly, the amount taken 
from either the fund or resource revenues for general budget purposes — the resource dividend 
— should neither be a fixed percentage of financial wealth, as done in Norway, nor should a 
fixed percentage of annual resource revenues be saved, as recommended by the Mintz 
Commission
16
. Instead, to first-order of approximation, the resource dividend should be a fixed 
percentage of the total of above-ground financial and below-ground resource wealth. In the 
presence of uncertainty, this result is modified slightly, as a small amount of precautionary 
saving is needed to cope with volatile oil and gas prices. The percentage that the resource 
dividend makes up out of total wealth is then slightly lower in the short term and higher in the 
long term reflecting the precautionary motive. Our optimal policies differ from Norway’s bird-
in-hand rule, which requires that all resource revenues are deposited in the fund and an annual 
dividend of 4.0 per cent of the fund is withdrawn (e.g., Bjerkholt, 2002; Barnett and Ossowski, 
2003). As the fund grows, the amount withdrawn from it each year increases. Yet, this bird-in-
hand rule violates the permanent-income hypothesis and is therefore suboptimal.  
Using historical data, we apply our results to the Alberta natural resource windfalls consisting of 
bitumen, conventional oil and natural gas with 2013 as the start date of our analysis and a 
corresponding initial oil price of $96 per barrel
17
. Our base case estimates suggest that the 
dividend that can be used to finance government spending or tax cuts is approximately $2,800 
per capita per year in 2013, subsequently growing at 2.0 per cent per year in real terms or, 
equivalently, at about 30 per cent of total government revenue at all times. Most of the 
corresponding saving is needed to smooth the dividend as a fraction of GDP. This necessitates a 
                                                          
16
 More recently, Landon and Smith (2013) advocate a rule that would deposit half of revenues in the 
fund and set resource dividends at 25 per cent of the fund. Norway deposits all revenues in its fund and 
withdraws 4 per cent of the fund each year. Although very useful from a policy perspective, such arbitrary 
rules are suboptimal from a welfare-optimizing perspective across the whole time horizon, must be re-
optimized periodically and are never sustainable in the long run. 
17
 Our results assume parity between the U.S. dollar, in which oil prices are typically denoted, and the 
Canadian dollar, which we use to present our results, based on the situation in 2013. Since 2013 the 
Canadian dollar has depreciated in value by approximately 20 per cent. Although we have not modelled 
any such trends nor possible additional volatility due to exchange rates, the depreciation of the Canadian 
dollar with resource fixed fixed in U.S. dollars would act to increase the value of resource rents and 
corresponding dividends as expressed in Canadian dollars. 
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growth in the fund from 5.7 per cent of GDP in 2013 to 39 per cent in 2030, 101 per cent in 
2050, and 165 per cent in 2100. In monetary terms, this corresponds to a size of net financial 
assets of $46,000 per capita in 2030 and $161,000 per capita in 2050 (both in 2013 dollars, not 
corrected for growth). This is equivalent to having a target fund in the aggregate of at least $200 
billion by 2030 and $1 trillion by 2050, compared to the $17.6 billion that the fund held as of 
March 2013. The amount that is needed to cushion against oil price volatility — the liquidity 
fund or Contingency Account — only plays a leading role in the early years, unless policy 
makers are very prudent.  
Although we have abstracted from the stochastic nature of above-ground investments, 
consideration must be given to the type of investment. The portfolio of assets should be fully 
diversified, both internationally and across different types of asset groups to minimize risk. The 
large amount of below-ground resource wealth necessitates that the optimal holdings of risky 
assets are leveraged up with a factor equal to the ratio of oil wealth to fund wealth, if necessary 
by going short and taking a negative position in the safe asset (Gintschel and Scherer, 2008; van 
den Bremer et al., 2016). The leveraging up of risky assets in the fund’s portfolio will be 
gradually undone as subsoil wealth is depleted. From a financial portfolio management 
perspective, it is important to have two different funds. The intergenerational fund has to 
smooth welfare across generations and is thus larger the more transitory the windfall. The 
liquidity fund, in contrast, has to collect precautionary buffers in the face of stochastic volatility 
which are larger when shocks are more permanent. In practise, the types of asset invested in and 
the maturity of the assets will also be very different for the two funds.  
Since Alberta has good access to international capital markets, as illustrated by the very low 
rates the Canadian government pays on international borrowing (see appendix B.1), there is no 
need to spend any part of the fund on public investment projects or to have a separate Alberta 
Heritage Capital Fund (e.g., Collier et al, 2010; van der Ploeg and Venables, 2012). The 
decision to invest in domestic capital should be solely based on a cost-benefit analysis, 
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independent of the availability of windfall proceeds, as access to international capital markets 
guarantees the availability of funds if needed. Moreover, such funds carry the danger of 
improper calculation of costs and benefits and of political manipulation. 
As with all welfare-theoretic analysis stretching across many decades, the figures reported here 
depend strongly on our assumptions, crucially here on the choice of social discount rate, the 
return on the fund and the initial oil price. Firstly, our results assume that the resource dividend 
is indexed to wages and productivity, as is typical for welfare benefits. However, if it is 
desirable to have a dividend that is constant in per capita terms, the case for building a large 
fund is much weakened or even reversed. It is implemented by setting the rate of time 
preference to the market rate of interest minus the product of the growth rate and 
intergenerational inequality aversion, so the rate of time preference is lower than the market rate 
of interest. It implies that, in a political sense, the resource dividend (associated wages, profits 
and benefits) is tilted towards future generations, as all benefit from productivity growth. This 
has been politically acceptable in Norway for many years and in many other countries too. 
However, this may be a much harder sell, if the country has not managed to build a fund when 
oil and gas exports and prices were high with substantial terms-of-trade improvements at that 
time. Unfortunately, this seems to be the case for Alberta, where only a very small fund has 
been built up. Policy makers might be more impatient politically and thus prefer to hand out 
hydrocarbon wealth much more quickly than our calculations suggest, evidently at the expense 
of future generations. 
Our sensitivity analysis confirms the order of magnitude of our estimates, but shows 
considerable variation in the actual numbers, largely reflecting the enormous and close to 
permanent nature of the windfall. Nevertheless, our estimates for precautionary saving provide a 
lower bound; the size of the reserves, future productivity of the non-resource part of the 
economy, extraction and transportation costs and the long-term cost of carbon emission provide 
considerable additional sources of uncertainty. Modelling the resource prices as random walk 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
 
23 
 
processes, an hypothesis which cannot be rejected statistically, indeed significantly increases 
optimal precautionary savings, as shown. Our analysis is partial equilibrium in nature, thus 
takes macroeconomic outcomes and asset returns as exogenous and excludes human capital, or 
in fact any other types of wealth other than resource wealth, and future pension liabilities. 
Secondly, if fund managers only achieve a real return of 4.5 per cent per year instead of our 
benchmark of 6.1 per cent per year, the optimal resource dividend drops from 30 to 20 per cent 
of government revenue. Yet, the required fund size by the end of this century increases from 
165 to 215 per cent of GDP. Finally, if the current plunge in oil prices turns out to be 
permanent, then our recommendation is to build up a fund of $75 billion by 2030, much more in 
line with the $100 billion advocated by the Mintz Commission. In practise, today all revenues 
from the existing Heritage Fund are consumed (with the exception of a small amount for 
inflation proofing). Further, with the Contingency Account set to disappear in the next few 
years and the new government (2015) to start borrowing for the first time in decades in light of 
sustained low oil prices,
18
 the game-changing nature of oil price volatility is once more 
emphasized.  
Finally, an important proviso must be made relating to climate policy, stranded hydrocarbon 
assets and endogenous extraction paths. McGlade and Ekins (2015) have calculated that, if 
policy makers throughout the world commit to their announced target of keeping global 
warming limited to 2 degrees Celsius, 80% of global coal reserves, half of global gas reserves 
and a third of global oil reserves should stay in the ground and never be burnt. More 
interestingly, these authors show that in view of the relatively high extraction costs and the large 
associated emissions, the Canadian oil sand reserves should not be burnt altogether (and the 
same applies to all hydrocarbon reserves in the Arctic). As carbon is gradually being priced 
higher and higher and this price is shifted to producers, especially if supply does not react much 
to prices and demand does, Canadian producers extracting oil from the oil sands will be hit 
                                                          
18
 From Alberta’s 2016 provincial budget 
(http://www.finance.alberta.ca/publications/budget/budget2016/index.html). 
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more and more. As time passes, there comes a moment that the price fetched for a barrel of oil 
from the oil sands on international markets falls below the sum of extraction costs and the 
carbon tax. This will happen most quickly for the most expensive fields and those fields will be 
taken out of production first. Hence, one way or another, Canada and Alberta in particular face 
substantial risks of stranded hydrocarbon assets. This makes it even more important for Alberta 
to save a larger fraction of hydrocarbon revenues, as its resource boom is likely to last a shorter  
time when global warming is taken more seriously and carbon policy uncertainty reduces the 
value of the reserves.   
With an increasing risk of stranded assets, it is also important to examine the impact on the 
optimal extraction path of an individual country.
19
 If markets perceive a risk, however small, 
that global leaders will finally undertake serious action to limit global warming to 2 degrees 
Celsius by curbing cumulative emissions to at most a few hundreds Giga tons of carbon, then 
the optimal rational response of each individual oil- or gas-producing country is to extract its 
hydrocarbon reserves as quickly as possible, before other countries sell their reserves and 
effectively exhaust the global carbon budget. Failure to cooperate can thus induce a race to burn 
the last ton of carbon with all the inefficiencies that result. If the risk of stranded assets speeds 
up oil and gas extraction, the expected net present value of future oil revenue increases due to 
reduced discounting of less distant rents, assuming the same amount of reserves is still extracted 
in total. The resource dividend increases because of the increase in net present value of the 
reserves. More is also saved in the intergenerational fund, as the windfall becomes more 
temporary and a greater initial build-up of the fund results. Crucially, more uncertainty results 
and the motive for precautionary saving becomes apparent once again.  
  
                                                          
19
 In our exercises we have kept our optimal extraction paths exogenous as given by various government 
projections. That is not unreasonable given that once fields are open extraction rates are pinned down by 
geological considerations such as Darcy’s law. However, the opening of fields itself is endogenous and is 
governed by Hotelling-type considerations (Anderson, et al., 2015). The dynamics may be different for 
bitumen produced from oil sands.  
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Appendix A: Volatility of the Resource Price and the dividend 
Empirical evidence (e.g., Hamilton, 2009) suggests that it is hard to reject the hypothesis that 
the crude oil price follows a random walk (a Brownian Motion process in continuous time). 
However, it is also not possible to reject a high degree of persistence with mean reversion (van 
den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2013). To avoid heteroskedasticity of the standard errors, we 
thus assume an AR(1)  stochastic processes for the logarithm of the price of bitumen, 
conventional oil or natural gas (Schwartz, 1997): 
(A1)   ( ) log ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),i i i i i i i i idP t t P t P t t P t W t            
where i  is the mean, i  the volatility, i  the drift, i  the rate of mean reversion and ( )W t a 
Wiener process. Equation (A1) can be written as an AR(1) stochastic process: 
(A2)     *log ( ) log ( ) ( ) ( ),i i i i i i i id P t t P t P t dt dW t             
where * 20.5 / .i i i i      Details of the calibration can be found in appendix B.2. Using three 
correlated stochastic processes for bitumen, conventional oil and natural gas, we can write the 
volatility of the dividend as: 
(A3)
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where B , O  and G  are the volatilities of the prices of bitumen, conventional oil and natural 
gas and BO , BG  and OG  are the correlations between the respective price processes.  
Instead of solving the system of partial differential equations numerically, we use the solutions 
to the deterministic solution to solve the problem approximately and obtain insight into the role 
of uncertainty. Formally, this approach would correspond to taking the first-order term in a 
Taylor-series expansion with the volatility i  as the small parameter, where the zeroth-order 
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term would correspond to the deterministic solution (see also van den Bremer & van der Ploeg, 
2013). We thus have from (4) that the effect of a shock at time t on the resource dividend at that 
same time is the net present value of all future effects of this shock: 
 (A4)    ( )
[ ( )( ) ]
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( ) (
) ,
)
( ( rt
t
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where the price process in (A3) gives: 
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It is evident then from (A4-A5) that mean reversion acts to decrease the effect of a price shock 
of the corresponding increment in the resource dividend and thus reduces the need for 
precautionary savings.  
  
Appendix B: Detailed Description of Data 
B.1. Real interest rates 
Over the 2002–2012 period, the average real annual rate of return on the Alberta Heritage 
Savings Trust Fund was 6.1 per cent with a nominal rate of return of 8.1 per cent
20
 and average 
inflation in that period of 2.0 per cent,
21
 compared to 3.7 per cent for the Norwegian Pension 
Fund Global over the same period.
22
  
The average real annual interest rates on Canadian and U.S. government bonds with maturities 
of 1 year, 5 years and 10 years over the same period were 0.4 per cent for Canadian and -0.6 per 
cent for U.S.; 1.1 per cent for Canadian and 0.4 per cent for U.S.; and 1.7 per cent for Canadian 
                                                          
20
 Alberta Treasury Board and Finance, Heritage Fund Annual Report 2012-2013, 
www.finance.alberta.ca/business/ahstf/publications.html.  
21
 Statistics Canada, Cansim Online Statistics Database (2013), http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/home-
accueil?lang=eng&p2=49&MM. 
22
 Norges Bank Investment Management, Annual Report 2012, 
http://www.nbim.no/Global/Reports/2012/Annual%20report/Annual%20report%202012.pdf. 
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and 1.2 per cent for U.S..
23
  For the 1992–2012 period, the same rates were 1.9 per cent for 
Canadian (0.8 per cent U.S..), 2.7 per cent (1.7 per cent) and 3.2 per cent (2.7 per cent). The 
average real annual interest rates paid on Alberta provincial debt over the period 2005–2012 
were 0.1 per cent, 1.3 per cent and 2.2 per cent on bonds with maturities of one year, 5 years 
and 10 years respectively.
24
 We set r = 6.1 per cent per year and abstract from the risky nature 
of the returns. 
B.2. Estimates of reserve stocks 
We use “remaining established reserves” as defined by the Alberta Energy 
Regulator (“recoverable quantities known to be left”)25. Remaining established reserves 
correspond approximately to proven reserves. We then allow for discoveries based on historical 
data. At the end of 2012, remaining established reserves are:
26
 
 Bitumen (or oil sands): 168 billion barrels. 
 Conventional oil (light and heavy crude): 1.7 billion barrels. 
 Natural gas: 5.8 billion barrels of oil equivalent (916 billion SM3). 
We obtain the following R/P (reserves to production ratios) for 2012: 
 Bitumen: at 2012 production rates of 0.72 billion bbl/year, we obtain a R/P ratio of 230 
years. We do not allow for future discoveries.  
 Conventional oil (encompassing light, heavy, and crude oil): at 2012 production rates of 
0.20 billion bbl/year we obtain an R/P ratio of 8.5 years. Although for conventional oil 
there are significant new discoveries over many decades, production has only 
marginally exceeded new discoveries in the last 10 years with 10-year (20-year) 
averages of 0.19 (0.25) and 0.20 (0.20) billion bbl/year, respectively. To reflect this, we 
                                                          
23
 Bank of Canada, Private Communication (2013); Statistics Canada, Cansim Online Statistics Database 
(2013); U.S. Federal Reserve, “Historical data on selected interest rates,” (Washington, D.C.: 2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm. 
24
 Alberta Treasury Board and Finance, Private Communication (2013). 
25
 Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB), “ST98-2013 Alberta’s Energy Reserves 2012 and 
Supply/Demand Outlook 2013–2022” (2013), http://www.aer.ca/data-and-publications/statistical-reports. 
26
 ibid.  
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assume discoveries decline linearly from 0.20 billion bbl/year to zero in 30 years and 
increase the current reserves by 3.0 billion barrels accordingly. 
 Natural gas: at 2012 production rates of 0.59 billion b.o.e./year, we obtain an R/P ratio 
of 10 years. We note significant new discoveries. Production has marginally exceeded 
new discoveries during the last 10 years with 10-year averages (20-year) of 0.78 (0.82) 
and 0.64 (0.60) billion b.o.e./year, respectively. We thus assume discoveries decline 
linearly from 0.64 billion b.o.e./year to zero in 30 years and increase current reserves by 
9.6 billion b.o.e.  
We exclude gas from oil wells (circa 10 per cent) and other natural resources such as coal and 
sulphur. Including our estimates for new discoveries, we use the following reserve estimates: 
 Bitumen: 168 billion barrels. 
 Conventional oil (light and heavy crude): 1.7 + 3.0 = 4.7 billion barrels.  
 Natural gas: 5.8 + 9.6 = 15.4 billion b.o.e. 
B.3. Official projections of extraction rates 
Official projections are available until 2022.
27
 In these official projections: 
 Bitumen (or oil sands): production rates almost double and reach 1.4 billion bbl/year in 
2021 from 0.72 billion bbl/year in 2012. 
 Conventional oil: production rates decline marginally from 0.20 billion bbl/year in 2012 
to 0.17 billion bbl/year in 2022.  
 Natural gas: production rates decline from 0.58 billion b.o.e./year in 2012 to 0.44 
billion b.o.e./year in 2022.  
We use these official projections until 2022 and from then on we assume: 
 Bitumen (or oil sands): in scenario 1 a continued linear increase of the production rate 
until 2.0 billion bbl/year in 2030 followed by a plateau at this rate of production until 
                                                          
27
 ibid. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 
 
32 
 
exhaustion in 2100; in  scenario 2 production reaches a plateau in 2022 and continues at 
the constant rate of 1.44 bbl/year until exhaustion at a later time.  
 Conventional oil: continued flat rate of production of 0.17 billion bbl/year until 
exhaustion in 2038. 
 Natural gas: continued flat rate of production of 0.44 billion b.o.e./year until exhaustion 
in 2044.  
B.4. Extraction costs 
Van den Bremer and van der Ploeg
28
 estimate that, apart from in the initial years 1970–75, when 
extraction costs were still very high as the very first exploratory and extraction activity took 
place, average extraction costs for Norway were U.S.$9/b.o.e. in the period 1990–2000, 
U.S.$6/b.o.e. for 2000-2005 and U.S.$14/b.o.e. for 2005–2010 (2013 prices). In the absence of 
data for extraction costs for conventional oil in Alberta, we thus set extraction costs to $15/bbl 
for conventional oil.  
Extraction costs are significantly higher for bitumen. The Canadian Energy Research Institute
29
 
provides estimates of the extraction costs (calculated from subtracting its estimates of royalties 
and income taxes from its estimates of total supply costs; see its figure E.1) for four different 
types of plants: 23, 36, 79 and 51 2011-WTI equivalent U.S.$/bbl. (i.e. the price at which 
extraction would just become profitable ignoring taxes and royalties). The Canadian Energy 
Research Institute
30
 assumes a constant price differential of 15 U.S.$/bbl between WTI and 
WCS, the price at which bitumen is sold following dilution for pipeline transportation. Ignoring 
diluent costs, we thus estimate extraction costs to be the average of these estimates minus the 
WTI-WCS price differential: 47 – 15 = $32/bbl.  
                                                          
28
 van den Bremer and van der Ploeg (2013). 
29
 Canadian Energy Research Institute, “Canadian oil sands supply costs and development projects (2012-
2046)” (2013), http://www.ceri.ca/images/stories/2013-06-10_CERI_Study_133_-
_Oil_Sands_Update_2012-2046.pdf. 
30
 ibid. 
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Furthermore, we note that there has been a significant increase in extraction costs in recent 
years. Comparing estimates of supply costs from 2012
31
 of 72 U.S.$/bbl WTI equivalent 
averaging across different extraction methods to comparable estimates from 2005
32
 of 
U.S.$35/bbl WTI equivalent reveals a twofold increase in costs in seven years (all prices are 
2013 prices). To reflect this increase, we assume a linear increase from $20/bbl in 2006 to 
$32/bbl to calculate historical rents in appendix B.7.  
Due to the shale gas revolution in the U.S. and the resulting sharp decline in North American 
natural gas prices, many of the reserves in Western Canada are in fact not economical to extract 
at current natural gas prices. For natural gas, the Canadian Energy Research Institute
33
 estimates 
extraction costs for vertical and horizontal extraction to be $7.60/mcf and $2.60/mcf or $43 and 
$20 /b.o.e.
34
 The 2012 price of natural gas is below this at $11/b.o.e. (see figure B.2). Despite 
the large variation of extraction estimates across different extraction methods and across 
different Canadian provinces ($2/mcf–$10.20/mcf or $11/b.o.e.–$57/b.o.e.) provided by the 
Canadian Energy Research Institute,
35
 we use $15/b.o.e., corresponding to extraction costs of 
conventional oil.  
We thus use the following extraction costs to calculate future resource rents: 
 Oil sands: $32 $ 15/bbl. 
 Conventional oil (light and heavy crude): $15/b.o.e.. 
 Natural gas: $15/b.o.e.. 
For natural gas, extraction costs may exceed prices, in which case we set resource rents to zero. 
Since we assume that Alberta gas is sold at the Henry Hub price and Alberta conventional oil is 
                                                          
31
 ERCB, “ST98-2013 Alberta’s.” 
32
 ERCB, “ST98-2013 Alberta’s.”  
33
 Canadian Energy Research Institute, “Conventional natural gas supply costs in western Canada” 
(2013), http://www.ceri.ca/images/stories/ceri_study_136_-_conventional_natural_gas_supply_cost_-
_final_june_2013.pdf. 
34
 ibid., figures 3.2 and 3.3. 
35
 ibid. 
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sold at the WTI price, we effectively abstract from transportation costs. Transportation costs 
only account for a small reduction in resource rents of the order of 5 per cent.  
B.5. Price processes 
Figure B.1 shows historical records of real oil and gas prices (discounted using Canadian CPI)
36
 
in Canadian dollars.
37
  
 INSERT FIGURE B.1 
We assume conventional oil is sold at the WTI price and natural gas at the Henry Hub NYMEX 
natural gas price.
38
 Also shown are the longer historical records: the world crude oil price
39
 and 
the U.S. natural gas wellhead price.
40
 To calculate the value of a barrel of bitumen, the costs of 
diluting heavy crude to make it transportable via pipelines have to be taken into account. 
Western Canadian Select therefore only provides an upper bound to the actual bitumen price. 
The average field gate price for bitumen
41
 provides our estimate of the actual price of bitumen.  
We use the values of the mean-reversion and volatility for the oil and gas price as estimated in 
van den Bremer and van der Ploeg (2013) (there is approximate parity of U.S. and Canadian 
dollars in 2013): 
 Conventional oil: a mean price of $110/bbl, a mean–reversion coefficient of 6.0 per cent 
per year, and a volatility of 26 per cent.  
                                                          
36
 Statistics Canada, Cansim Online Statistics Database (2013), http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/home-
accueil?lang=eng&p2=49&MM. 
37
 Exchange rates from Statistics Canada, Cansim Online Statistics Database (2013). 
38
 Government of Alberta, Department of Energy, Private Communication (2013). 
39
 BP, Statistical Review (London: BP, 2013), http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-
bp/statistical-review-of-world-energy-2013.html. 
40
 USEIA, “Independent Statistics and Analysis” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2013), www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3a.htm. 
41
 Government of Alberta, Department of Energy (2013). 
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 Bitumen: the same mean–reversion coefficient and volatility as conventional oil, but a 
substantially lower mean price of $80/bbl,
42
 which assumes a constant price differential 
of $15/bbl between WTI and WCS). 
 Natural gas: a mean price of $32/b.o.e., a mean–reversion coefficient of 6.0 per cent per 
year, and a volatility of 20 per cent. 
We set the correlation coefficients between the different prices to one. The time horizon of our 
analysis starts Jan. 1, 2013. We use the 2012 prices as the initial prices:  
 Conventional oil: $/bbl. 
 Bitumen: $64/bbl. 
 Natural gas:  $11/b.o.e.. 
Extraction of natural gas will not be profitable in the initial years with extraction costs of 
15$/b.o.e., but will eventually become profitable as a result of reversion to the mean. All prices 
are in 2013 Canadian dollars unless otherwise indicated.  
B.6. Economic and population growth 
Alberta has seen relatively high rates of population growth, with a 10-year average of 2.2 per 
cent growth and 20-year average of 2.0 per cent growth,
43
 but growth is forecasted to decline to 
1.3 per cent in the next three decades. In part due to volatile oil prices, Alberta’s GDP has been 
very volatile, with 10-, 20- and 30-year average real per capita growth rates of 3.8 per cent, 3.8 
per cent and 1.4 per cent, respectively. In part these growth rates reflect the expansion of the 
resource-extraction sector. To calculate growth in non-resource GDP, we calculate resource 
rents as described above. Figure B.2 shows the share of resource revenues and resource rents of 
total Alberta GDP with averages of 24 per cent and 12 per cent for the range for which data is 
available. Subtracting resource rents gives per capita non-resource GDP growth rates of 3.2 per 
                                                          
42
 cf. CERI, “Canadian oil sands.” 
43
 Statistics Canada, Cansim. 
( 2013) 96OP t  
( 2013)BP t  
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cent for the last 10 years and 3.0 per cent for the period for which we have calculated resource 
rents (17 years). Excluding not just resource rents, but total resource revenues we obtain 3.8 per 
cent and 3.2 per cent, respectively.  
We set trend population growth to n =1.3 per cent with population size at end of 2012 equal to 
3,873,745
44
 and set trend growth of non-resource GDP to n + g = 3.3 per cent per year, which 
implies a trend productivity growth of g = 2.0 per cent per year. 
 INSERT FIGURE B.2 
B.7. Historical series of government resource rents 
Alberta government income derived from the extraction of oil and gas and bitumen consists of a 
variety of fees and royalties of which the conventional oil royalty, the oil sands royalty and the 
natural gas and by-product royalty are the major components. In addition, the Alberta 
government receives a share of the corporate income tax paid by the resource-extracting sector. 
Figure B.3 shows the sum of these rents as received by the government in absolute values
45
 and 
as a share of total resource rents.  
On average, resource revenues constitute approximately one-third of total Alberta government 
revenues (part of of the income from corporate income taxation is received at a national level by 
the federal government). The government take (the share of total resource rents that is 
ultimately received by the Alberta government) is 34 per cent for the period 2002–2012. To get 
at optimal savings for the Alberta government, we take optimal savings for the economy as a 
whole and multiply it by 0.34. The government can only save that part of resource rents that it 
receives as royalty or tax income in the first place. We also suppose in our calculations that the 
size of the Alberta government relative to the total Alberta economy stays constant at 14 per 
cent based on an historical average. 
 INSERT FIGURE B.3 
                                                          
44
 ibid. 
45
 Government of Alberta, Treasury Board and Finance, Private Communication (2013). 
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B.8. Initial size of the fund 
We include the Contingency Account ($2.7 billion) and the Heritage Savings Trust Fund ($14.9 
billion) to give a total initial fund size of $17.6 billion (5.7 per cent of total GDP in 2012) at the 
end of March 2013.
46
 We do not include the much smaller funds, such as the Medical Research 
Endowment Fund and the Scholarship Fund, since these have not been funded by oil and gas 
revenues and reflect savings as part of the non-resource part of the economy. 
                                                          
46
 Government of Alberta, Budget 2013, http://budget2013.alberta.ca/. 
Table 1: Estimates of the optimal fund sizes, resource dividends and savings for the 
Alberta government (CRP = 3 and extraction scenario 1) 
 
Intergenerational 
fund  
(per cent of 
GDP) 
Liquidity fund 
(per cent of 
GDP) 
Total fund (per 
cent of GDP) 
Dividend (per 
cent of 
government 
revenue) 
Saving (per 
cent of 
government 
revenue 
2013 
4.8% 
($3,800 pp 
$3,800 pp) 
0.9% 
($700 pp 
$700 pp) 
5.7% 
($4,500 pp 
$4,500 pp) 
26% 
($2,800 pp 
$2,800 pp) 
3.5%, 2.1% 
($400 pp 
$400 pp) 
2020 
12% 
($9,900 pp 
$11,000 pp) 
1.9% 
($1,500 pp 
$1,800 pp) 
14.0% 
($11,000 pp 
$13,000 pp) 
25% 
($2,900 pp 
$3,300 pp) 
12%, 1.5% 
($1,300 pp 
$1,500 pp) 
2030 
35% 
($29,000 pp 
$41,000 pp) 
4.0% 
($3,400 pp 
$4,700 pp) 
39% 
($33,000 pp 
$46,000 pp) 
26% 
($3,000 pp 
$4,200 pp) 
16%, 0.4% 
($1,900 pp 
$2,700 pp) 
2050 
95% 
($72,000 pp 
$151,000 pp) 
6.4% 
($4,900 pp 
$10,000 pp) 
101% 
($77,000 pp 
$161,000 pp) 
30% 
($3,200 pp 
$6,600 pp) 
-6.7%, -1.0% 
(-$700 pp 
-$1,500 pp) 
2100 
159% 
($112,000 pp 
$639,000 pp) 
6.5% 
($26,000 pp 
$148,000 pp) 
165% 
($117,000 pp 
$665,000 pp) 
33% 
($3,200 pp 
$18,400 pp) 
-28%, 1.6% 
(-$2,700 pp 
-$16,000 pp) 
 
Note: The size of the fund in 2013 is $17.6 billion. The size of resource wealth in 2013 is $1.24 
trillion in 2013 or $320,000 per capita or 400 per cent of GDP. For comparison with the figures 
in the table, we must multiply this by 0.34, the share of resource rents that accrues to the 
government, to give $420 billion, $109,000 per capita, or 137% of GDP. In each cell, the first 
figure in brackets is in dollars per person. They are corrected for productivity growth and thus 
grow at 2.0% per year. The second figure in brackets is uncorrected for productivity growth. 
The figures in the last column report total and precautionary saving as percentage of 
government revenue; figures in brackets are total saving, growth-corrected and uncorrected. 
Table(s)
Figure 1: Historical data and projections for extraction rates and reserves 
a.  Bitumen reserves b. Bitumen extraction 
  
c. Conventional oil and gas reseves d. Conventional oil and gas extraction 
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Figure 2: Dividend and fund size with different degrees of prudence  
(extraction scenario 1) 
a. Resource dividend b. SWF buildup 
  
 
 
Figure 3: Spend all, permanent-income hypothesis and bird-in-hand 
(extraction scenario 1) 
a. Resource dividend b. SWF buildup 
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Figure 4: Resource dividends as percentage of the fund 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Optimal spending and build-up of fund for different extraction scenarios 
(CRP=3) 
a. Resource dividend b. SWF buildup 
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Scenario 1: CRP=3 
Scenario 2: CRP=3 
Figure 6: Effects of a lower real return on fund assets 
a. Resource dividend b. SWF buildup 
  
 
 
Figure 7: Initial resource dividend and final fund size (t = 2100) as function of initial and 
mean prices 
a. Initial resource dividend b. Final fund size (t = 2100) 
  
Note: In the base case, initial prices are $64, $96 and $11 per barrel of oil equivalent for 
bitumen, conventional oil and natural gas, reverting to mean prices of $80, $100 and $32 per 
barrel of oil equivalent, respectively. Although only the conventional oil price is shown on the 
x-axis for reference, an equivalent scale factor ranging between 0.4 and 1.6 is applied to all 
three initial prices. For the two steepest lines (blue) the scale factor is applied to both initial and 
mean prices, whereas for the two less steep lines (red) the scale factor is only applied to the 
initial prices. 
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Figure 8: Effect of price process (mean reversion vs. random walk) 
a. Resource dividend b. SWF buildup 
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Figure B.1: Real oil and natural gas prices (2013 prices) 
a. Historical oil prices 
 
b. Historical natural gas prices 
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Figure B.2: Resource revenues and resource rents as a share of total GDP 
 
 
 
Figure B.3: Alberta government resource revenues 
a. Total resource rents b. Share of government revenue 
  
 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Sh
ar
e
 o
f 
to
ta
l G
D
P
 [
%
] 
Resource revenues 
Resource rents 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 
[b
ill
io
n
 2
0
1
3
 C
.$
] 
Total resource 
revenues 
Total resource rents 
Alberta Government 
Resource Revenue 
00 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
2001 2006 2011 
Sh
ar
e
 [
%
] 
Share of resource rents in 
government budget 
Share of Alberta Government 
Revenue in total resource rents 
Response to reviewer 1 
We would like to thank the reviewer for his positive and helpful report. We address all his 
detailed comments below (original comments in italics).  
 P 26, the year is missing in the references (line 43). 
We have updated the reference with the correct year and other publication details. 
 After p.37 page numbers are missing. 
We suspect this is due to the online submission software, as page numbers are present in the 
manuscript we submitted. In any case, they should be present in the updated manuscript.  
  Table 1 the heading of 1st column is missing "year". 
Thank you; we have added this.  
 The colours in figures are not visible when printed in black and white. Better to use other 
ways for identification such as markers or patterns of curves instead of colour.  
We have taken up this point and made sure that the lines in each figure are labelled using dashed, 
dotted, etc. lines and annotation, so that they can be distinguished when printed in black and 
white. We have kept the colours, since they can be seen in the online version consulted by most 
people. We have adjusted the references to the lines in the figures in the text accordingly. 
Reviewing the clarity of all figures, we have improved the explanation of figure 7 in the key and 
in the text.  
 Figures do not have consistent design and titles. Most of them got full frame, but not 
Figure 1 and Figure B2-3 got double frame. The titles of figures are not consistent, they all 
located in appendix B, but some are called Figure 1-8, the rest is called Figure B1-B2. When 
figures or tables citied from appendix it is better to mention the location which is Appendix B so 
the reader can easily find them. Otherwise this is an interesting and good paper and I enjoyed 
reading it. 
We have updated the frames for consistency. The figures now have consistent designs. We 
believe our figures are consistently numbered, with figures in the appendix labelled as B. These 
figures are only referenced in appendix B.   
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Response to reviewer 3 
We would like to thank the reviewer for his positive and helpful report. We address all his 
detailed comments below (original comments in italics).  
 If I could make a wish for a theme of one more in-depth discussion, I would pick the role 
of an increased risk of stranded assets. The paper already touches upon related issues, e.g. on p. 
23, but I think it would be helpful to be more explicit about stranded assets. The current global 
discussion on the need for a "green shift" and less use of hydrocarbons brings up the issue of 
lower hydrocarbon prices going forward and stranded assets. What happens if prices get lower 
than extraction costs in the case of Canada at different points in time? The saving and fiscal 
adjustments to such a shift are perhaps the most obvious thing to analyse in the current set up of 
the model. The authors are already undertaking price analyses and some changes in production 
profiles (although not with stranded assets).  
This is an excellent and highly topical comment. McGlade and Ekins (2015, Nature) have shown 
that in view of the relatively high cost of extracting oil from the tar sands and the high carbon 
emissions that are associated with it, Canada should keep all of its tar sands untouched in order 
for global warming not to exceed 2 degrees Celsius. We have added a paragraph at the end of the 
conclusion about this and the general notion of stranded assets. Of course, world leaders cannot 
dictate Canada to shut down production from its tar sands. A more likely outcome is that carbon 
is gradually being priced more and more and higher and higher in the global economy. As the 
burden of the higher carbon price is shifted to producers, especially if supply does not react 
much to prices and demand does, Canadian producers extracting oil from the tar sands will be hit 
more and more. As time passes, there comes a time that the price fetched for a barrel of oil from 
the tar sands on international markets falls below the sum of extraction costs and the carbon tax . 
This happens quickest for the most expensive fields and those will be taken out of production 
first. Hence, one way or another, Canada and Alberta in particular face substantial risks of 
stranded hydrocarbon assets. This makes it even more important for Alberta to save a bigger 
fraction of hydrocarbon revenues because its resource boom is likely to last shorter when global 
warming is taken more seriously. 
 Furthermore, consequences for the optimal extraction path are a natural next question 
for the government.  Although this may lie outside of the model used in the paper, a discussion 
about it, including the consequences for savings, would be helpful. I imagine it would mean 
moving extraction closer to the present and hence a larger fund as a share of GDP early on? 
This would perhaps make the use of a bird-in-hand rule more similar to the PIH? 
In our exercises we have kept our optimal extraction paths exogenous as given by various 
government projections. That is not unreasonable given that once oil fields are open extraction 
rates are pinned down by geological considerations such as Darcy’s law. However, the opening 
of fields itself is endogenous and is governed by Hotelling-type considerations (Anderson, 
Kellogg and Salant, Hotelling under pressure). The dynamics may be different for bitumen. We 
thank you for pointing out that the optimal extraction path may well be affected by the risk of 
stranded assets and we now discuss this in the last paragraph of the conclusion too. Our 
argument is that, if markets perceive a risk, however small, that global leaders will finally 
undertake serious action to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius and thus to limit 
cumulative emissions to a couple of hundred Giga tons of carbon, then the optimal response of 
each individual oil- or gas-producing country is to pump up it as quick as possible before other 
countries sell their hydrocarbon reserves and effectively exhaust the global carbon budget. 
Failure to cooperate can thus induce a race to burn the last ton of carbon.  
If the risk of stranded assets speeds up extraction, the expected net present value increases due to 
reduced discounting of less distant rents, assuming the same amount of reserves is still extracted 
in total. The resource dividend increases because of the increase in net present value of the 
reserves. More is also saved, as the windfall becomes more temporary and a greater initial build-
up of the fund results. 
 I like that the paper is already clear about indexation and that the smoothing happens in 
terms of share of GDP rather than as a fixed amount per capita. This is a crucial assumption, 
which in some sense means that the resource dividend is tilted towards future and richer 
generations. This has been politically acceptable in Norway, where a historically lucky period of 
terms-of-trade improvements together with high oil exports, meant a sudden large oil fund. For 
Alberta, where the process has yet to start, as it seems, and one did not manage to build up a 
fund during the previous good 15 years, this may be a much harder sell. The paper therefore 
risks describing something that is somewhat unrealistic to have impact on actual policy. 
Thank you for this very useful comment. It is indeed important that we smooth handouts as share 
of GDP rather than handouts per capita. Doing it this way, hand-outs are indexed to productivity 
growth, so that all incomes along a balanced growth path grow at the same rate. It is 
implemented by setting the rate of time preference to the market rate of interest minus the 
product of the growth rate and intergenerational inequality aversion, so lower than the market 
rate of interest. It indeed implies that in this political sense the dividend, like wages, profits and 
hopefully benefits too, are tilted towards future generations, as all benefit from productivity 
growth. As you say, this has been politically acceptable for many years in Norway and many 
other countries too. However, this may be a much harder sell politically if the country has not 
managed to build a fund when oil and gas exports were high and prices high with substantial 
terms-of-trade improvements. Unfortunately, this seems to be the case for Alberta in which case 
hydrocarbon wealth will be handed out much more quickly than suggested by prescriptions. We 
have extended the discussion of these issues in the conclusions.  
 
